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Quantum cloud computing is emerging as a popular model for users to experience the power of quantum
computing through the internet, enabling quantum computing as a service (QCaaS). The question is, when the
scale of the computational problems becomes out of reach of classical computers, how can users be sure that the
output strings sent by the server are really from a quantum hardware? In 2008, Shepherd and Bremner proposed
a cryptographic verification protocol based on a simplified circuit model called IQP (instantaneous quantum
polynomial-time), which can potentially be applied to most existing quantum cloud platforms. However, the
Shepherd-Bremner protocol has recently been shown to be insecure by Kahanamoku-Meyer. Here we present a
generalized model of cryptographic verification protocol, where the Shepherd-Bremner model can be regarded
as a special case. This protocol not only can avoid the attack by Kahanamoku-Meyer but also provide several
additional security measures for anti-forging quantum data. In particular, our protocol admits a simultaneous
encoding of multiple secret strings, strengthening significantly the hardness for classical hacking. Furthermore,
we provide methods for estimating the correlation functions associated with the secret strings, which are the key
elements in our verification protocol.
Introduction.— Despite the fact that near-term quantum
computers would be noisy and of intermediate scale [1], they
have the potential in performing specific tasks intractable
for any classical computer, a status knows as quantum
supremacy [2–6]. A natural question arises: how could we
tell if a remote device is truly quantum or not? This ques-
tion is not only of fundamental interest in nature [7], but also
relevant to many computing protocols involving two parties,
namely a verifier and a prover.
Particularly, in delegated quantum computation, the prover
interacts with the verifier in order to convince the verifier to
believe that the computational results are indeed from a quan-
tum device. One can construct different scenarios with differ-
ent assumptions. For example, one may assume that the veri-
fier can use limited quantum power and quantum communica-
tion [8–14], or one may allow multiple spatially separated en-
tangled provers [13, 15]. These protocols can be made secure
without any computational assumption. However, the caveat
is that they may not be applicable to the near-term quantum
cloud computing model in practice.
On the other hand, with standard post-quantum crypto-
graphic assumptions, such as the quantum hardness of the
learning-with-errors (LWE) problem [16], verification proto-
cols can also be devised [17–19]. However, existing quantum
cloud computing models involves purely classical clients who
can only send out classical descriptions of the quantum cir-
cuits to the service provider and receive the resulting statistics
of the output bit strings through the internet. Again, from
the practical point of view, it would be desirable to directly
incorporate the verification process into the cloud computing
process without much modifications.
In 2008, based on the model of IQP (instantaneous quan-
tum polynomial-time) circuits, Shepherd and Bremner pro-
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posed [20] a cryptographic verification protocol which fits
very well the scope of the near-term quantum cloud comput-
ing. In their protocol, the verifier constructs an IQP circuit
from the quadratic-residue code (QRC) [21], which is en-
coded with a secret string kept by the verifier. Then he/she
sends the classical description of the IQP circuit to the prover,
who returns the output strings of the IQP circuit to the ver-
ifier. Finally, the verifiers checks if a certain measurement
probability, associated with the secret string, is the same as a
pre-determined value.
The Shepherd-Bremner protocol was previously believed
to be secure for a long time, backed up by the classical in-
tractability of simulating general IQP circuits [22, 23]; gen-
erally, IQP circuits cannot be sampled even approximately
with efficient classical algorithms, unless the polynomial hi-
erarchy collapses, which is a highly implausible complexity-
theoretic consequence. However, Kahanamoku-Meyer has
recently found [24] a loop hole in the Shepherd-Bremner
protocol, and constructed a classical algorithm to break the
Shepherd-Bremner protocol. The loop hole is originated from
the special properties of QRC encoding the secret string from
the IQP circuit. Once the secret is known, the prover can effi-
ciently generate output strings that can bypass the verification
test, even without running the quantum circuit.
Here, we present a generalized model of IQP-based cryp-
tographic verification protocol for near-term quantum cloud
computing, which can be reduced to the Shepherd-Bremner
protocol as a special case. However, we may choose to con-
struct the secret-encoded IQP circuit without depending on
any error-correcting code. Therefore, our approach is in-
trinsically immune to the attack of Kahanamoku-Meyer’s ap-
proach. Furthermore, this model allows us to encode an un-
specified number of secret strings, instead of relying only on a
single secret string as in the Shepherd-Bremner protocol. This
significantly increases the difficulty for the prover to cheat,
i.e., hacking multiple secret strings simultaneously with the
same set of output bit strings.
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2In addition, we provide a general sampling method for an
efficient estimation of any correlation function associated with
a secret string, which gives the verifier a pre-determined value
for checking. We further show that for random IQP circuits,
the majority of these correlation functions can be exponen-
tially small, supported by numerical simulations together with
an example on the random 2-local IQP circuits. Neverthe-
less, we discuss the possibility of “quantizing” the values of
the correlation functions through a connection with a family
of Clifford circuits. Consequently, correlation functions with
sizable values can be constructed by starting with a small sys-
tem (Hamming weight), followed by a scrambling technique
to expand the Hamming weight if necessary.
A general framework.— An IQP circuit of n qubits can
be represented by an m-by-n binary matrix χ, where each
row represents a Pauli product. For example, a row vector
(1, 1, 0, 0) represents X1X2, where Xi is the Pauli-X acting on
the i-th qubit. The Hamiltonian is the sum of m Pauli opera-
tors, and the resulting IQP circuit is given by the time evolu-
tion of the Hamiltonian, i.e., UIQP := eiθH . For example,
χ =
(
1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1
)
=⇒ H = X1X2 + X2X4 (1)
=⇒ UIQP = eiθX1X2 eiθX2X4 . (2)
Here, one may choose θ = pi/8 as considered in Ref. [20].
However, in our framework, we can also cover all possible
cases where the angles of each term can be arbitrary, and they
may not necessarily be the same.
Our verification protocol is similar to the original proto-
col [20], except that the encoding method is largely extended.
Moreover, we will follow the physical picture previously in-
troduced by the authors in Ref. [25]. Explicitly, let us consider
a quantum circuit of n qubits:
The quantum cloud verification protocol:
Step 1. Alice (the verifier) generates one, or multiple, n-bit ran-
dom string(s) s := (s1, s2, · · · , sn)T ∈ {0, 1}n kept as
a secret, where each string is associated with a Pauli
product,Zs := Z s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Z sn .
Step 2. Based on the secret string(s), Alice designs (to be dis-
cussed) a Hamiltonian H consisting of a linear combi-
nation of Pauli-X products.
Step 3. Alice then sends the classical description about the
Hamiltonian H to Bob (the prover) and asks him to ap-
ply the time evolution to the state |0n〉, where the angles
of each term (i.e. the evolution time) are also deter-
mined by Alice.
Step 4. Bob should perform the quantum computation UIQP|0n〉
accordingly and return the output strings to Alice, mea-
sured in the computational basis.
Step 5. Finally, Alice calculates the correlation function(s)
〈Zs〉 := 〈0n|U†IQPZsUIQP|0n〉, and compares it with the
results constructed by the bit strings given by Bob.
Note that in the Shepherd-Bremner protocol [20], Alice will
instead check the probability bias Ps⊥, the probability of re-
ceiving bit strings that are orthogonal to s, which is defined
as,
Ps⊥ :=
∑
x·s=0
p(x) , (3)
where p(x) is the output probability of the IQP circuit. How-
ever, as shown in Ref. [25], the probability bias can be related
to the correlation function as follows,
Ps⊥ = 12(〈Zs〉 − 1) . (4)
Therefore, these two measures of success are equivalent, but
we choose to work with the correlation function, as it fits bet-
ter our framework.
Furthermore, in the Shepherd-Bremner protocol, only one
secret string is considered for each time, and the Hamilto-
nian is constructed from a specific error-correcting code, the
quadratic-residue code (QRC) [21], which can be regarded as
a special instance in our framework. In this case, 〈Zs〉 always
equals 1/
√
2 (in terms of probability bias, 0.854). In our case,
the construction may or may not involve QRC; therefore, the
correlation function 〈Zs〉 can be any value between ±1 in gen-
eral.
Next, we make a further remark about the potential class
of methods attacking our protocol, i.e., for Bob generating bit
strings that can reproduce the value of the correlation func-
tion(s) without a quantum computer. It would be possible if
Alice’s secret strings s are leaked to Bob; then, Bob could
potentially evaluate the value of 〈Zs〉, and output random
bit strings according to the probability bias Ps⊥. Therefore,
the security of the IQP protocol is based on the assumption
that the secret string cannot be efficiently recovered from the
Hamiltonian H. For the original Shepherd-Bremner protocol,
such an attack has recently been found [24] based on the prop-
erties of QRC.
Here our framework extends the encoding method in the
protocol, making it immune to such kind of attack. Further-
more, since the number of secret strings is not revealed to Bob,
which makes it challenging to attack without running the full
quantum circuit.
Properties of the correlation function.— For Alice to
evaluate correlation function(s), we first note that relative to
each string, the Hamiltonian H = HM + HR can be divided
into two parts: main part and redundant part. (i) The main
part HM anti-commutes with Zs, i.e., {Zs,HM} = 0. (ii) The
redundant part HR commutes withZs, i.e., [HR,Zs] = 0.
Due to these commuting properties relative to the secret
strings, the value of the correction function only depends on
the main part, i.e.,
〈Zs〉 = 〈0n|ei2θHM |0n〉 . (5)
Note that one can arrive at a similar expression if we further
relax the condition where the weight of each term can be un-
even, e.g. H = αX1X2 + βX2X4. See Appendix A for details.
On the other hand, the correlation function can be evaluated
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FIG. 1. (a) Fractions of correlation functions of specific values ver-
sus the number of qubits n in the IQP circuits. Data is obtained by
searching over 10000 random IQP circuits for each n. (b) Correla-
tion functions from 500 randomly generated 6-qubit IQP circuits and
Pauli operators Zs. The data fluctuation is because the correlation
functions are obtained via random sampling.
directly, if we confine the Hamming weight of the secret string
to be sufficiently small, and the main part HM only acts on
those qubits invovled in the Pauli productZs.
In fact, for the general cases, the evaluation of the expres-
sion of 〈Zs〉 can be achieved efficiently by sampling:
Theorem 1. The correlation function of any Puali-Z product,
〈Zs〉 := 〈0n|U†IQPZsUIQP|0n〉 associated with an IQP circuit,
can be classically estimated to  precision with probability
1 − δ, by taking O
(
1
2
log 2
δ
)
random samples.
To see why this theorem holds, one can apply local
Hadamard gates to changing the main part HM to the z-basis,
i.e.,
〈Zs〉 = 12n
∑
x
〈x|(U(z)M )2|x〉 , (6)
where U(z)M is the main part of the circuit with Pauli-X replaced
by Pauli-Z. Each term in this summation can be efficiently
calculated, with an absolute value bounded by 1. Then by
the Chernoff bound argument, one can randomly sample an x,
calculate 〈x|(U(z)M )2|x〉, and use the sample average to approx-
imate 〈Zs〉 to  precision with probability 1 − δ. We leave the
𝑠 = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
𝑠 = (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0)
Scrambling × 1
Redundant part 𝐻𝑅Main part 𝐻𝑀
𝑠 = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
𝑠 = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)Scrambling × 2
……
Scrambling × 200
FIG. 2. The scrambling process in the matrix representation. Here,
HM (the blue block) initially acts only on first few qubits. After the
first scrambling, the third column of the matrix is added to the last
column, and the last entry of s is added to the third one, correspond-
ingly. Similarly, after the second scrambling, the first column of the
matrix is added to the fifth one, and the fifth entry of s is added to
the first one. The resulting matrix after 200 times of scrambling is
shown in the lower left corner, and the acting range of the main part
extends to the whole circuit.
details in Appendix A. Thus, for a polynomially small correla-
tion function, the precision  can also be polynomially small,
and this method is efficient with classical means. Note that
using the same sampling method, Bob can also evaluate any
correlation function efficiently even if the redundant part of
the Hamiltonian is included. However, the correlation func-
tion(s) associated with the secret string(s) is hidden from Bob.
On the other hand, even though we have an efficient means
for evaluating the correlation function to some additive error,
it does not directly imply an effective solution to the prob-
lem. For a random instance of HM , the value of the result-
ing correlation function could be small from the experimen-
tal point of view (see Fig. 1 (a) for numerical results); this
makes it difficult to distinguish from the uniform distribution.
For example, for random 2-local IQP circuits of the form,
U = ei
pi
8 (
∑
i< j wi jXi⊗X j+∑i viXi), we have the following theorem,
bounding the occurring probability of large correlation func-
tions:
Theorem 2. For the class of random 2-local IQP circuits, the
probability of finding a polynomial-sized correlation function
〈Zs〉 is exponentially small, i.e.,
Pr
U,s
(
〈Zs〉2 ≥ 1poly(n)
)
≤ 3 poly(n)
2n
. (7)
We leave the proof in Appendix C. Theorem 2 implies that,
for such kind of random Hamiltonians, it is not easy for Al-
ice to keep secret strings associated with correlation functions
with sizable values.
In the following, we discuss how one may construct corre-
lation functions that can take values significantly larger than
zero. One possible way to achieve this is to choose θ = pi/8,
which makes 〈Zs〉 = 〈0n|ei(pi/4)HM |0n〉 to be identical to an am-
plitude from a Clifford circuit. In this way, (i) one can evaluate
4the correlation function efficiently using the Gottesman-Knill
algorithm [26], and (ii) the value of 〈Zs〉 is either 0 or 2−g/2,
where 0 ≤ g ≤ n is an integer decided by the stabilizer groups
of |0n〉 and ei(pi/4)HM |0n〉 [27] (see Appendix A for a detailed
illustration and Fig. 1 (b) for the simulation results of random
6-qubit instances).
From the practical point of view, it would be more desirable
to have g being zero or one, making the correlation function
being 1 or 0.707. As far as we are aware, there is no known
efficient scheme of constructing an explicit Clifford circuit of
the form ei(pi/4)HM , for a fixed value of g. Practically, this ap-
proach may be first applied for a secret string of relatively
small Hamming weight. Then, a brute-force search is taken
to find an HM that can yield a Clifford circuit with a small
value of g (sizable 〈Zs〉). In fact, for a Hamiltonian with the
same θ for each term, one can extend the Hamming weight of
the secret strings by the method of scrambling as previously
introduced in Ref. [20]. Specifically, the scrambling process
refers to a column manipulation of the matrix χ. For example,
we can add the first column to the third in Eq. (1), resulting
in a new Hamiltonian H = X1X2X3 + X2X4. See Fig. 2 for an
illustration of a more complex example.
Moreover, the following theorem implies that for IQP cir-
cuits, the scrambling process leaves the correlation function
unchanged (see Appendix B):
Theorem 3. Denote CM as the linear subspace spanned by
the column vectors of the main part, i.e., the matrix represen-
tation of HM . When all θ’s are identical, we can express the
correlation functions in the following form:
〈Zs〉 = 12d
∑
c∈CM
cos[2θ(q − 2|c|)] , (8)
where d is the dimension of the linear subspace CM , q is the
number of terms in HM and |c| is the Hamming weight of c.
A similar result was previously obtained in Ref. [20] in
terms of the probability bias. From this theorem, one can
see that the value of 〈Zs〉 depends only on the linear sub-
space CM since each term in the expression depends only on
c ∈ CM . Therefore, even if HM is scrambled, as long as the
secret string is also scrambled accordingly, to preserve the or-
thogonality with rows in χ, then the linear subspace CM will
remain unchanged and so is the value of 〈Zs〉.
For example, in the upper left corner of Fig. 2, s =
(0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) and the main part is the first 3 rows (i.e.
q = 3). The linear subspace CM is spanned by the column vec-
tors in the blue block, namely a1 = (0, 0, 1)T , a2 = (0, 1, 0)T ,
and a3 = (1, 0, 1)T (i.e. d = 3). In this way, the vectors of the
linear subspace takes the form c =
∑3
i=1 yiai, with yi ∈ {0, 1}.
After the scrambling, one can check that each column in the
new main part can be written as linear combination of the
three vectors {a1, a2, a3} , which means the new linear sub-
space is the same as CM . So the correlation function after the
scrambling remains the same too. We remark that the scram-
bling invariance holds for the case of multiple secret strings as
well.
Conclusion.— In summary, we have discussed a gener-
alized model of IQP-based cryptographic verification proto-
col, where several features are introduced to achieve anti-
forging of the quantum data. This model can be reduced to
the Shepherd-Bremner protocol as a special case, but one can
construct the secret without relying on the quadratic residue
code, avoiding a class of attacks proposed by Kahanamoku-
Meyer.
We remark that the applicability of our framework is not
limited to IQP circuits. For example, one may design a quan-
tum circuit of the following form: U = URUM , where UR
commutes with a certain observable O. In this way, we also
have 〈0n|U†OU |0n〉 = 〈0n|U†MOUM |0n〉 depends only on the
main part. In the case that UM acts on a small number of
qubits, the expectation can be calculated by classical simula-
tion. Furthermore, one may consider an extension to quantum
circuits like U = UshallowV†V , where Ushallow is a shallow sub-
circuit and V contains random unitary gates; of course, the
overall gate order should be scrambled to the prover. In this
case, the verifier can check any observable based on shallow
part only.
Returning to our framework, the most imminent open ques-
tion is a lack of a rigorous security proof of the general pro-
tocol. Practically, the protocol should be implemented in a
scale beyond the capability of classical computing, i.e., in the
regime of quantum advantage (supremacy). Furthermore, it is
also necessary to take noises into account. These questions
should be addressed with large-scale numerical simulations in
future.
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Appendix A: Properties of the correlation functions
Let the main part and the redundant part of the IQP circuit
be UM and UR. Since each gate in the IQP circuit commutes
with each other, we can assume without loss of generality that
UIQP = URUM , which gives 〈Zs〉 = 〈0n|U†MU†RZsURUM |0n〉.
From the fact that the redundant part UR commutes with Zs,
we have,
〈Zs〉 = 〈0n|U†MZsUM |0n〉 . (A1)
Furthermore, with the anti-commutation of HM and Zs, we
have U†MZsUM = ZsU2M and
〈Zs〉 = 〈0n|U2M |0n〉 . (A2)
Then we apply Hadamard gates to change the basis,
〈Zs〉 = 12n
∑
x,y
〈x|(U(z)M )2|y〉 (A3)
=
1
2n
∑
x
〈x|(U(z)M )2|x〉 , (A4)
where U(z)M is the main part of the circuit with Pauli-X replaced
by Pauli-Z and we have used the fact that 〈x|(U(z)M )2|y〉 = 0 if
x , y. Each term in the summation can be efficiently calcu-
lated by tracking the phase. By the Chernoff bound argument,
〈Zs〉 can be approximated to  precision with probability 1−δ
using O
(
1
2
log 2
δ
)
samples of x, as stated in the main text.
Specifically, if θ = pi/8, then U2M = e
i2θHM , and Eq. (A2)
becomes,
〈Zs〉 = 〈0n|ei2θHM |0n〉 . (A5)
Here, ei2θHM is a Clifford circuit since 2θ = pi/4, and the cor-
relation function can be exactly calculated by the Gottesman-
Knill algorithm [26] in this case. Moreover, the value of 〈Zs〉
is either 0 or 2−g/2, where 0 ≤ g ≤ n is the minimum number
of different generators of the stabilizer groups of two states:
|0n〉 and ei2θHM |0n〉. For example, if the generator associated to
|0n〉 is given by {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4}, and that of ei2θHM |0n〉 is given
by {Z1,Z2, X1X2,Y2Z4}, then the number of different genera-
tors is 2. The set of generators is not unique, and g is the
minimum over all possible generators associated to two states.
Appendix B: Expansion of the correlation function
Now we want to prove that 〈Zs〉 depends only on the linear
subspace spanned by the matrix representation of HM . First,
denote M as the matrix representation of HM . Eq. (A4) gives,
〈Zs〉 = 12n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
〈y|
∏
p∈row(M)
ei2θZp |y〉 , (B1)
6where Zp := Zp1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zpn . Then,
〈Zs〉 = 12n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
∏
p∈row(M)
exp
(
i2θ(−1)p·y) (B2)
=
1
2n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
exp
i2θ ∑
p∈row(M)
(−1)p·y
 (B3)
Define cy := M · y to be an encoding of y under M. Recall
that M contains q rows, so we can write
cy =

p1
...
pq
 · y =

p1 · y
...
pq · y
 , (B4)
which means that each entry in cy equals p ·y for p ∈ row(M).
Then
∑
p∈row(M)(−1)p·y equals the number of zeros in cy minus
the number of ones (i.e., Hamming weight |cy|), which gives,∑
p∈row(M)
(−1)p·y = q − 2|cy| . (B5)
So, we arrive at,
〈Zs〉 = 12n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
cos[2θ(q − 2|cy|)] , (B6)
where we used the fact that 〈Zs〉 is real. Now, in the column
picture, we can write M = (a1, · · · , an), where ai ∈ col(M) is
a column vector of length q. Thus,
cy = M · y = y1a1 + · · · + ynan . (B7)
Suppose the dimension of CM is d, and without loss of gener-
ality, assume {a1, · · · , ad} forms a basis. Then,
c = y1a1 + · · · + ydad (B8)
for any c ∈ CM . So the expression of 〈Zs〉 becomes,
〈Zs〉 = 12n−d
∑
yd+1,··· ,yn
 12d ∑c∈CM cos[2θ(q − 2|c|)]
 (B9)
The first summation will give a factor of 2n−d, which cancels
with 12n−d . So finally, it ends up giving,
〈Zs〉 = 12d
∑
c∈CM
cos[2θ(q − 2|c|)] . (B10)
Every term in the summation depends on the element c, and
therefore 〈Zs〉 depends only on the linear subspace CM .
Appendix C: The problem from anti-concentration
In Ref. [23], it is proved that for random 2-local IQP circuits
of the form
UIQP = ei
pi
8 (
∑
i< j wi jXi⊗X j+∑i viXi) , (C1)
with wi j, vi ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 7}, the output probability is anti-
concentrated. Specifically, the anti-concentration theorem
states that,
EU[p(x)2] ≤ 322n (C2)
for all x, where EU denotes a uniform average over all IQP
circuits of the form of Eq. (C1), that is over uniform choices
of wi j and vi. Then we have,
EU
∑
x
p(x)2
 ≤ 32n . (C3)
By definition, the correlation function can be written as,
〈Zs〉 =
∑
x
p(x)(−1)s·x , (C4)
which actually holds for a general quantum circuit. This
means that p(x) is the Fourier transform of 〈Zs〉, and that
p(x) =
1
2n
∑
s
〈Zs〉 (−1)s·x . (C5)
Then we can apply the Parseval’s identity [28],∑
x
p(x)2 =
1
2n
∑
s
〈Zs〉2 , (C6)
which gives,
EU,s
[
〈Zs〉2
]
=
1
2n
∑
s
EU
[
〈Zs〉2
]
(C7)
= E
∑
x
p(x)2
 (C8)
≤ 3
2n
. (C9)
The Markov’s inequality gives the following bound,
Pr
U,s
(〈Zs〉2 ≥ a) ≤
EU,s
[
〈Zs〉2
]
a
≤ 3
a2n
, (C10)
for a > 0. Setting a = O(1/ poly(n)), we have,
Pr
U,s
(
〈Zs〉2 ≥ 1poly(n)
)
≤ 3 poly(n)
2n
. (C11)
This means that for random 2-local IQP circuits, the proba-
bility that the correlation functions are polynomially small is
exponentially small.
In practice, Alice will obtain the correlation function from
Bob’s data in the following way. Suppose Alice receives T
output strings from Bob, x1, · · · , xT . For each string, Alice
computes (−1)s·xi , and the sample average
sT :=
1
T
∑
i
(−1)s·xi (C12)
7gives an approximation of 〈Zs〉. From the Chernoff bound ar-
gument, for  precision and probability 1−δ, T = O
(
1
2
log 2
δ
)
.
In order for our protocol to be practical, T should be a
polynomial of n, which implies a polynomial precision  =
O(1/ poly(n)). However, if 〈Zs〉 itself is exponentially small,
then Alice will not be able to distinguish the correct data
from data obtained from uniform distribution, since polyno-
mial precision in this case is not sufficient.
